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SOME PRINCIPLES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 




1. A Second Look at Localistic Case: The Egodeictic Space Hierarchy 
1. The Nucleus: Inside and Outside 
3. Trees: Constituency or Dependency? 
4. IT and AT as in and out 
5. Three Principles 
6. Ordering Principles and Predictions 
7. The Space Hierarchy and Psychological Reality: Sequence as Hierarchy 
in Cognitive Development and Language Acquisition 
O. Introduction 
Because of limitations of space, this paper is fragmentary, i.e., 
this extraction omits pages of important material. Because of limitations 
of time, this work is still preliminary. 
Of the omitted material, some was originally introductory and some 
appended. The introductory material proceeded from a critique of Fillmore 
case grammar to adoption of a set of "deep case" relations corresponding 
essentially to Gruber's thematic relations and then to a critique of 
Anderson's 1971 work on localistic case grammar. This material led the 
way to where we begin here. 
The appended material was pages of wholesale extraction from the 
literature on language acquisition (mostly anthologies, for the sake of 
the lay reader) and cognitive development (with heav,y concentration on 
the work of Jean Piaget and his associates in Geneva). 
I hope that in spite of these omissions, the reader will be able to 
follow and will find profit in this attempt to penetrate through some 
deep regularities of ordering in linguistic representations (deep and 
shallow trees and strings) to the cognitive principles which seem to 
underlie them. 
It should be noted that because of the above-mentioned omissions 
together with the time and space limitation which imposed them, we begin 




1. A Second Look at Localistic Case: The Egodeictic Space Hierarchy 
We will now consider a revision of case grammar which will, it is 
hoped, (1) incorporate all the valid insights and claims of the case 
system proposals discussed above, (2) exclude any false generalizations, 
(3) make a wide range of 11 new 11 predictions about natural languages, and 
(4) be clearly falsifiable at a wide number of points. The framework is 
localistic in that all 11 case categories 11 are held to be defined in terms 
of 11 deep 11 function (IT, AT, FM, TO, or nom, l oc, ab l, a 11) in conjunction 
with an egodeictically ordered hierarchy of 11 spaces 11 through which the 
deep relations are projected. 
The core of our localistic approach is the widely noted set of 
relations abbreviated as IT and AT (or, in the case of transitional 
verbs, IT, FM, and TO). This set of relations is cited, exemplified, 
and argued as basic in Gruber (1965) and Anderson (1971). Note that 
while Fillmore's Objective case is 11 neutral 11 but not necessarily present 
as one of the case relations of every verb, Gruber's IT and Anderson's 
nom are assumed to be neutral and obligatory elements of each clause 
(Gruber 1965:28-29; Anderson 1971:37). The assumption of an obligatory 
IT in every clause together with the principle of "one instance of a 
case relation per simple clause 11 2 will impose superordination analyses 
upon phenomena associated with transitivity; from a re-examination of 
transitivity the strict semantic clause structure assumed here (Verb, IT, 
(AT)) will lead to a hierarchical pattern of superordinate structures. 
The Source-like nature of the Agentive or ergative case relation 
can be seen both in its semantic force and in its syntactic behavior. 
Gruber (1965:171-194) recognizes and demonstrates this behavior of Agt 
NP's, but fails to incorporate the agentive FROM-NP into his otherwise 
integrated theme-source-goal framework because of its apparently uniquely 
superordinate status. 
We intend to show here that there are considerable possibilities 
for deeper analysis. However, a formal representation of this will 
not be attempted. 
We shall be content to settle with analyzing the A~ent subject as 
being generated from a from-prepositional phrase. (1965:189) 
Thus Gruber's formalization has theme NP's, location NP's, goal NP's and 
source NP's one subset of which represents the superordinate Agent NP. 
In Anderson's work, the Agentive case relation (erg) is reanalyzed 
as superordinate as a necessary consequence of his reanalyzing it is as an 
underlying ablative (his 'locational' FM case relation): 
Erg and abl are 'sources' -- abl commonly spatial (or temporal); 
erg causal with causatives, and in general 'the source of the 
action'. (1971 :174) 
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I propose that we provide for the erg/abl relation and for the 
restriction on the co-occurrence of erg and locative cases by, in 
the first place, adopting the superordination account of causatives, 
and secondly, regarding erg as being equal to abl in the absence of 
loc. {1971 :175) 
At this point I wish to digress to a suggested analysis for various 
kinds of verbs and their respective collections of NP relations. This 
digression will introduce and illustrate a proposed extension of super-
ordination solutions. 
Assuming every clause to have at least an IT and no more than one 
AT (or FM-TO pair) suggests the following: 
CLAUSES OF STATE OR LOCATION (static position): the verb names and predic-
cates a relation between IT and AT: 
(31) (position) My brother is in Colorado. 
IT AT 
(32) (possession) That book is mine. 
IT ""A'r 
(33) (time) The fight was at eight o'clock. 
IT AT 
(34) (circumstance) We were in debt. 
IT AT 
(35) (class membership) He is a linguist. 
li AT 
CLAUSES OF PROCESS OR MOVEMENT (i.e., event, transition, position switch): 
the verb (directional as opposed to locational) names and predicates a 
relationship between IT and a pathway specified by FM and TO; 




IT FM TO 
Sam sank from ecstatic excitement to deep depression. 
IT FM TO 
Hansel changed from librarian to lumberjack. 
IT FM TO 
The picnic went from noon till after dark. 
IT FM TO 
ACT CLAUSES (transition of a state, process, an event from volition to 
fact, from "in the Agent" to "in the world" or to "in existence"}: the 
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verb names and specifies a relationship between an animate (or at least 
typically interpreted as capable of intention) FM and an event IT: 
(40) He rolled the marble from the doorway to the far wall. 
IT FM TO 
IT 
(41) Willie sold the books (from himself) to me. 
IT FM TO 
FM IT 
(42) I bought the books from Willie (for myself). 
IT FM TO 
FM IT 
EXPERIENCE CLAUSES (transition of a state, process, an event from 11 out 
there 11 (in the world) to 11 in here 11 (consciousness as possession of assim-
ilated data)): theverb names and predicates the relationship between IT 
(typically an event) and TO (a being capable of assimilating IT into 
consciousness): 
(43) A shocking realization hit him. 
IT TO 
(44) Why did that have to happen to me? 
rT TO 
(45) Barry learned that his car had been towed away. 
IT TO 
TO IT 
(Note that sentence (45) has a stative (non-transitional) counterpart: 
(46) Barry knew that his car had been towed away. 
IT TO 
AT IT 
Facts such as this will bear on later discussion.) 
I propose that there is a non-arbitrary basis for characterizing 
both the parallel and the contrast between 11 transitive 11 and 11 spatial 11 
movement. What I consider to be the ultimate failure of Anderson's case 
system lies in his lack of any principled basis for characterizing the 
various 11 kinds 11 of location and directionality. Fillmore's system, a 
one-dimensional list, fails even to capture the parallel. Anderson's 
superordinate analysis for the abl case relation associated with causative 
verbs (cf. Gruber's Agent-as-FROM-NP) is suggestive of the following 
observations: 




































We see here deep but apparently limited parallelism between the 11 spatial 11 
and 11 transitive 11 clause type case relations. I suggest that we keep in 
mind not just the ACT clauses but the above so-called EXPERIENCE clauses. 
In these clauses also there is potential if not obligatory embedding, i.e., 
the Experiencer NP is a superordinate TO-NP. 
According to this analysis, there are at least two deep case rela-
tions ( 11 localistic 11 ) which must be allowed as superordinate: a SOURCE 
(typically human in the sense of being regarded as capable of volition 
in the fullest sense) of events (which themselves are complete clauses) 
and a GOAL (interpreted as capable of psychological experience) of events 
to be assimilated. A glance at (45) and (46) shows that the contrast of 
stative versus transitional verbs corresponds precisely to the contrast 
of the relationships AT versus TO on this superordinate level. This 
level of superordinate NP's is markedly occupied by objects interpreted 
as human {or at least animate) beings. 
Anderson, having apparently lost or ignored the superordinate 
status of the TO NP in these clauses, leaves them collapsed in his loca-
tive case as an instance of abstract location, a subcase called 11dative 11 
{dat): 
I have suggested that the case-inflexion ( 1dative 1 ) ••• marks the 
variant of the locative which is found with such 'affective• verbs 
(and is typically animate). This suggestion would seem to accord 
with the apparent origin of the dative in Indo-European-~as recon-
structed in e.g. Kurylowicz, 1964:190-5 ('The dative is geneticall1 
nothing less than an offshoot of the loc used with personal notins') 
--and the frequent occurrence of the same inflexion or·preposition 
for both 'dative• and 'spatial' locatives. I shall try to show below 
with respect to certain other constructions ••. that the distribution 
of the 'dative' inflexion {in e.g. many Inda-European languages) is 
not entirely haphazard--i.e., that the 'dative·• is to a considerable 
extent a predictable variant of the locative .... {Notice too that 
the fact that the animate subject in clauses with such verbs is 
derived (in English and other languages) from an underlying locative 
{sometimes marked by a 'dative• inflexion) contributed2to specula-tions on the 'passive' nature of the transitive verb.) (1971:103) 
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It is helpful to note at this point that for Anderson loc includes dat 
and that loc {and therefore dat) includes both loc {cf. AT) and all {TO). 
Throughout the remainder of our discussion we will distinguish all from 
loc.3 
Noting that Anderson's parallel between transitive and directional 
clauses as diagrammed earlier in this discussion {his 1971:173) does 
not represent directly {if at all) that each set of case relationships 
{each clause) requires a nom {IT); and further wishing to incorporate the 
dative {TO) complement to the ergative {FM) relation on the superordinate 
















Gruber {1965:60-61) points out that Source-and-Goal have a certain 
homogeneity: their parameters do not mix, e.g., possessional and positional 
motion cannot be combined in one FM-TO pair. Location among human beings 
{"Human place" or possessional location) corresponds deeply and directly 
to the dative locative case relationship, and indeed is not always easy 
to distinguish from 'spatial' locatives {Fillmore 1968:61-61; Gruber 1965: 
41-47; Kimball 1972; Lyons 1968:298-302, 388-399; Anderson 1971':100-118, 
esp. 107-118). Another phenomenon, a nearly commonplace observation, is 
the apparently 'genitive' or possessive morphology associated ~ith the 
ergative case in those languages called "ergative languages", and in other 
languages as well, especially in so-cal·led SOV languages {Fillmore 1968:14; 
Anderson 1971:52). A partial explanation of this phenomenon will be 
attempted later in this discussion, particularly with respect to its distrib-
ution among languages. 
Without duplicating the evidence already widely available in the 
literature, I have tried to show that there is a sphere or realm of 
location/motion which shows uniform behavior with respect to the case 
relations {IT and AT, FM-TO) and yet is unique in the sense that position 
in this realm may be the position predicated of objects {IT= simple NP) 
or may be predicated of events, processes, or states {IT= Sor sentential 
NP). Position {or location or distribution) in this sphere, discussed 
thus far in terms of ergativity, dative-ness, possession, giving, acquisi-
tion, etc., is seen as location with respect to positions defined or . 
interpreted to be {human) BEINGS, or persons. This realm of "community" 
or "social universe" I shall call SOCIAL SPACE (SOC). Its distinct 
identit~ at this point in our exploration rests upon the necessity of its 
superor inate status in some of the clause types we have examined. Its 
~ as a space is assumed at this point on the basis of its regular dis-
tri6u"tion and behavior of case relations. 
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Having introduced SOC, I will introduce more spaces, relate them, 
show their roles in this matter of case grammar revision, try to justify 
their postulation onlinguistic grounds, explore certain empirical and 
theoretical consequences, and suggest grounds for motivating this case 
gramnar revision which are quite external to and independent of linguistics. 
Turning from SOC, we will next consider location (position, distribu-
tion) in the more concretely spatial realms of Place and Time. Ignoring 
the tautologous nature of "introducing" Place and Time as spaces in a 
11 localistic 11 case system, we note the linguistic (cognitive?) parallel 
between location of an entity in a position and possession of an entity 
by its position of occurrence in a given space, pointed out in Anderson 
1971:100-118; Kimball 1972, 1974; Lyons 1968:388-399). As noted in Kimball 
1974, possession by a spatial position is in some cases alienable, while 
possession by a temporal position is inalienable. This difference between 
the two spaces represents one possible class of evidence for their being 
separate spaces in the linguistic sense. The parallel (i.e., in handling 
by natural languages) between spatial and temporal position is manifestly 
obvious (Anderson 1971:12; Lyons 1968:298, 301) in general; in particular, 
their int~mate relationship is seen in their complementary use with a FM-
TO pair associated with the verbs of motion discussed earlier: the one 
allowable pair could apply either to Place or Time. In these clauses of 
physical motion, movement through Space implies movement (progression) 
through Time; however, progression through time does not imply movement 
from one place to another. Another difference in the behavior of the 
two spaces is reflected in the asymmetrical distribution of spatial and 
temporal locatives with respect to "first-order" and."second-order" 
nominals (cf. objects vs. events) (Lyons 1968:346-349). 
Location in three-dimensional spatial poisitions will be called 
location in SPATIAL SPACE (SPA). Temporal location will be called loca-
tion in TEMPORAL SPACE (TEM); FM/SPA is the starting point, and TO/SPA 
the stopping point; in temporal space, FM/TEM is the time of inception, 
and TO/TEM is the time of cessation. Note that the apparent dilemma of 
Source and Goal in Space and Time disappears when we see that motion 
through SPA implies motion through TEM and that the motion is in a sense 
a single pathway through four dimensions (three defining SPA and the 
other TEM), with a single FM point designated in terms of four dimensions 
and a single TO point designated in terms of the same four dimensions. 
We have introduced and roughly defined three spaces, SOC, SPA, and 
TEM. There remains one more space to be introduced: LOGICAL SPACE 
(LOG). Kimball 1972 points out and to some extent demonstrates 11 a 
manifest regularity" between temporal and logical relations. On observ-
ation concerning the parallels and distinctions holding among the spaces 
is that of successive inclusion, to be discussed later. At this point we 
will say that the typical objects or entities related and/or located in 
SPA are physical objects (i.e., quality conjunctions), the objects re-




Position in a given space (perhaps even reference to a space) 
implies a center; though this will be discussed in clearer detail later, 
I would like to call ·to our attention the inherent (pre-displacement) 
center of each of the spaces mentioned as being the same as the center 
of deixis in each of its realms: · 
11me 11 SOC 
11 here 11 SPA 
11 now 11 TEM 
11 in this case" LOG 
That absolute and exclusive reference in terms only of the absolute 
center(EGO) is equivalent to non-existence of (or at least zero different-
iation among) these spaces will be of interest later. Note for now that 
EGO is the primitive center of each of these spaces in the sense that EGO 
is the conjunction of the centers of these four spaces. 
A final exemplary paradigm might help focus the four spaces intro-
duced: "location" in one space is often easily paraphrased in terms of 
others: 
(47) Whoever has a left hand has a left arm. 
{48) Where(ver) there's a person with a left hand, there's a 
person with a left arm. 
(49) When(ever) there's a person with a left hand, there's a 
person with a left arm. 
(50) If there's a person with a left hand, there's a person with a 
left arm. 
(51) Who(ever) shuts his ear to the cry of the poor, 
He will also cry himself and not be answered. 
(52) Where(ver) ears are shut to the cry of the poor, 
there will be one's own unanswered cries. 
(53) When(ever) ears are shut to the cry of the poor, 
then one's own cries will be unanswered. 
(54) If one shuts his ear to the cry of the poor, 
then he too will cry unanswered. 
(51)-(54) are rough paraphrases of Proverbs 21:13; in (51) two events are 
related and located as act and experience in SOC; in (52) the two events 
are related in terms of SPAtial distribution; in (53) the location is 
TEMporal; and in (54) their relationship is LOqical. 
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The relationship, it should be noted, between entity and position 
holds within each space. The space-specific referents involved may in 
fact be only relatively different in their being interpreted as "thing'' 
and "place". For example, the same tree is IT in (55) and ·AT in (56); the 
same board meeting is IT in (57) and AT in (58): 
(55) The tree is in our back yard. 
IT AT 
(56) There is a squirrel living in the tree. 
IT AT /SPA 
(57) The board meeting was held last night. 
IT AT 
(58) Some coffee was drunk during the board meeting. 
IT AT /TEM 
The difference between a given IT and AT seems in many cases to corres-
pond to a sort of distributional inclusion with respect to the salient 
space, but we will not try to address the question. 
I have introduced four spaces, SOC, SPA, TEM, and LOG; I have 
tried to suggest that the integrity and distinctiveness of each can be 
demonstrated in terms of available linguistic facts, and, has to some 
extent already been demonstrated in the literature referred to. The next 
step is to show that they are, in some nontrivial sense ordered among 
themselves. 
Although SOC and SPA are mutually distinctive in many cases, there 
are also cases in which in some languages (e.g. English, Khmer) in which 
a same syntactic sentence may be ambiguous as to whether a given verb is 
predicating transition in SOC or in SPA or perhaps in both: 
... it may be observed that possessives and locatives are not al-
ways clearly distinguishable in three-place constructions. It 
would be impossible, and it is perhaps unnecessary, to say whether 
Bring me the book is 'possessive' or locative (whether me is the 
'indirect object' or 'directional'): we have already drawn atten-
tion to the fact that the same case or preposition is used in many 
languages for both the 'indirect object' and 'motion to' .... 
Once again, we notice the similarity (and perhaps the ultimate 
identity) of locatives and possessives. (Lyons 1968:399) 
The significance of such observations is that, while there are six logic-
ally possible conjunctions of spaces (in terms of pairings of sin9Je 
spaces, i.e. SOC-SPA, SOC-TEM, SOC-LOG, SPA-TEM, SPA-LOG, TEM-LOG}, there 
is evidence that only three of the six space intersections (and/or contig-
uities) are of such linguistic standing as to be observed, recognized, 
and discussed in, e.g. the previously mentioned wor~ of Anderson, Fillmore, 
Kimball, Lyons. The three space contiguities (intersections, areas of 
interference or blend) which do show linguistic salience (semantic and/or 
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morphological) are the three which in the above list are underlined: SOC-
SPA, SPA-TEM, and TEM-LOG. 
Areas of neutralization of semantic contrast and identity of morpho-
logical representation which serve to 11 connect 11 SOC and SPA are widely 
cited (e.g. Anderson 1971:100-118; Lyons 1968:300-302, 391-399); it is 
only speculation on my part that connects this fact with the fact that 
one 1s own b)dy is located in (exists in, is possessed by) both a personal 
11 self11 (SOC and physical position (SPA), i.e. is both (inalienably) a. 
11 possession 11 linguistically and, of course, a physical object. Extension 
of this conjunction of 11 possession 11 and spatial extension lead-s to terri-
toriality, domain (social, political, economic) beyond the body. 
The area of contiguity or intersection connecting SPA and TEM, 
illustrated in their inseparability with respect to the behavior of Source 
and Goal with verbs of motion (Fillmore 1971a; also see Kimball 1974), is 
associated with conceptions of 11 objective reality 11 , physical existence, 
or 11concrete existence 11 • 
Discussing certain properties of logical space, Kimball (1974:8-9) 
makes the following observations: 
There is a manifest regularity between the relations expressed by 
a word in its temporal and logical uses. Namely, if a word W 
says that event E1 occurs earlier than E2 in time, then in its 
logical used a statement P1 W P2 means that P1 is a condition of 
P2. Where E1 W E2 says that E1 is temporally prior, P1 W P2 says 
that P1 is logically prior. 
Many cases of temporal words being used to express logical relations 
come to mind. The 11 follow 11 of 11 follow from 11 as in 11The truth of 
this follows from the truth of that 11 is clearly the temporal 11 follow 11 
Why the ablative 11 from 11 appears here in the logical use needs to 
be explained; its occurrence, however, should shed some light on 
how the language treats logical relations. Second, the 11 then 11 of 
11 if-then 11 is homophonous with the temporal 11 then 11 , and, at the same 
level of generality, is clearly the same word. For 11 then 11 we see 
most simply illustrated the maxim stated in the paragraph above 
the relation between the logical and temporal notions expressed 
by a word. 
One can make the following observation concerning the nature of 
logical space. Whereas, as with temporal space, relations between 
propositions in logical space are asymmetrical, irreflexive and 
transitive; but logical space is not connected. That is~ for any 
two events, it is the case that one precedes the other. However, 
for any two propositions it need not be the case that one follows 
from the other. Furthermore, while 11earlier than 11 in time is anti-
symmetrical, in the sense that if E1 preceeds E2, then it's not the 
case that E2 precedes E1; logical priority is not so. That is 11 if 
p, then q11 and 11 if q, tflen p11 can be true simultaneously. 
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We have already seen some examples ((47)-(54)) of mutual paraphras-
ability among all four spaces. Obviously, then, possibility (or even 
ease) of paraphrase between teffil)oral and logical e..mressions canno:t_~~rve 
as a criterion for pairing or joining TEM and LOG in any unique way. How-
ever, as Kimball's quoted paragraphs show, there are word in English which 
have both temporal and logical uses but are restricted to only those 
two spaces. Just as o~ in French applies to both and only SPA and TEM, so 
are there words (e.g.--irfollow11 , 11 then 11 ) which have both and only temporal 
and logical uses not only in English, but through other languages as well 
(e.g. German~' Mandarin 11.:. jiu as 'immovable adverb', Kachin ~, 
etc.). Words pairing logical relations uniquely to those of any one of 
the other spaces (e.g. "therefore" in English: LOG and SPA) are not only 
much fewer in number than those having temporal and/or logical uses, but 
seem to yield to analysis as special cases (e.g. "therefore" expressing 
11 facing 11 properties in TEM and LOG (but not in SPA!)). 
We will now summarize the space continguities: 
SOC+ SPA, SPA+ TEM, TEM + LOG 
or equivalently: 
LOG+ TEM, TEM + SPA, SPA+ SOC 
Note that two of the spaces, SPA and TEM, exhibit two contiguities 
each, while the other two, SOC and LOG, have only one each. Collapsing 
the (already suggestively arranged) sequences given above, we get: 
SOC+ SPA+ TEM + LOG (or LOG+ TEM +SPA+ SOC). 
These two (equivalent) orders are two of the twenty-fou~ possible linear-
izations; taking full reversals to be equivalent, the order given above 
amounts to one of the twelve logically possible orderings. 
This order, far from random or accidental, embodies a continuum or 
progression of a very interesting kind. For now limiting ourselves to 
two "semantic" parameters, we see that the above ordering of the fo-ur 
spaces reflects not just a collection of morpho-syntactic generalizations, 
but embodies a progression of conceptually egodeictic remoteness. With 
respect to animateness, the objects and positions of SOC represent the 
ultimate in capacity for volition, consciousness of cognitive processes, 
etc., as interpreted linguistically; the entities and/or positions of 
SPA are less consistently regarded as animate in the fullest sense just 
referred to, but may be attributed some of these qualities ( e .. g. the 
progression: humans, animals, living things, objects) most of the time 
or all of these qualities part of the time (e.g. in pronominal reference, 
linguistic gender, "she's beautiful", of a ship, etc.); I know of very 
little attribution of such qualities to TEMporal objects and/or positions 
other than as the result of deliverate attempts to be poetic; and finally 
I know of no specific or general attribution of animateness -qualities to 
abstract relations or logical propositions as such (LOG). · Thus, in terms 
of the thinking and linguistic behavior of persons, the SOC+SPA+TEM+LOG 
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order represents a progression or hierarchy of remoteness from or dis-
similarity to EGO. It is in this sense that the spaces are egodeicti-
cally ordered, i.e., ordered with reference to the primitive center EGO. 
What is meant by the use of this terminology is that not only does egodei-
xis have significance within each space, but, I will attempt to show, 
egodeixis holds among the spaces as well, i.e., orders them. The other 
parameter which may serve to demonstrate some of this hierarchy of 
remoteness inherent in this interspatial order is the concrete-abstract 
continuum. The intimate vividness of relations in SOC represents the 
high point of (cognitively interpreted) concreteness or definition: the 
intensity and seeming clarity of the reality or existence of one's own 
acts, experiences, and personal possessions needs no elaboration; 
recognition of SPAtial positions and especially the physical objects in 
them is also accompanied by some (cognitive sense of) immediacy, poten-
tial if not actual; TEMporal objects (e.g. events, processes)~ however, 
seem much more vague or remote, perhaps thought of as entities in what 
seems to be mostly metaphorical, in some extended or 11derived 11 way. The 
abstract entities (e.g. propositions) and relations of LOG are, of course, 
the most abstract. 
2. The Nucleus: Inside and Outside 
Our discussion so far has been an introduction to two ·key elements 
of a case grammar revision: (1) the strict localistic assumption that 
one set of relations holds in all realms (e.g. both in transitive and 
spatial-transition clauses): 
IT (theme), AT (location, position), and, in the case of motional 
(transitional, transitive, nonstative) verbs, a pathway defined by 
a FM-TO (source-goal) pair. 
Assuming the requirement that each clause have one and only one theme 
(IT), that a simple clause have no more than one instance of a given case 
relation, forces solutions which involve analysis of certain clauses as 
systematically complex, formalizable in terms of superordinate configur-
ations. The single set of case relations is assumed to be projected 
through a (2) sequence of spaces which correspond to the hierarchy seen 
in superordinate configurations of 11 complex 11 clauses. The ordering of 
the spaces is seen to correspond also to an egodeictic hierarchy of re-
moteness, i.e., egodeixis is pertinent both intraspatially and inter-
spatially. 
What we have so far, then, is the case relations and the (ordered) 
spaces through which the relations are projected. In contrast to Fill-
more's one-dimensional list and Anderson's superordinate causative and 
otherwise unitary single level of deep case relations, we might diagram 
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case relations 
transitional clauses 
IT FM TO 
IT FM TO 
IT FM TO 
IT FM TO 







Some rough equivalents can be pointed out between various of these 
relation-space conjunctions and the case relations of Fillmore and 
Anderson. Fillmore's Agentive and Anderson's ergative are equivalent to 
FM/SOC in case the IT is sentential, i.e., FM/SOC represents the human 
sources of events (acts); in case the act is in some sense being given 
not to the world at large but to some specific person, we have TO/SOC as 
Fillmore's Benefactive. When both FM/SOC and TO/SOC are specified in-
dividuals and the IT is not sentential, we have a mere(?) transfer of 
possession, suggestive of Fillmore's Source and Goal and Anderson's ab-
lative and (dative) locative. When a sentential IT moves from an un-
specified FM to TO/SOC, we have Fillmore's Experiencer and, presumably, 
Anderson's dative locative. 
While the equivalenees among the relations in SPA and TEM and the 
Source-and-Goal-of-Place-or-Time and Anderson's 11 spatial 11 abl-all are 
fairly obvious, the projection of our case relations through LOG seems to 
have no correlate in Fillmore's and Anderson's systems.4 
Some further explication may be helpful. The various syntactic 
shapes which IT can take I assume to be equivalent for the purposes of 
relational function; for example: 
(60) IT may be manifested as any of the following: 
a) "complex NP 11 : (the thing (which) s) that 
b) "headless relative": (what S) 
c) simple NP: (that thing) 
d) pronoun: (it) 
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Examples are given respectively in (61.a-d): 
(61) a) The thing that she really wanted was the ring. 
b) What she really wanted was the ring. 
c) That thing was the ring. 
d) .!.1 was the ring. 
Corresponding syntactic manifestations of arguments when in the 
AT relation are: · 
(62) a) 11 complex PP 11 , i.e. preposition+ 11 complex NP 11 
b) 11 subordinate clause 11 , i.e. 11 headless relative 11 
c) simple PP, i.e. preposition+ simple NP 
d) 11adverb 11 
Examples for each space follow: 
(63) AT/SOC 
a) Give the pen to the person that smiles first. 
b) Give the pen to who(ever) smiles first. 
c) Give the pen to that person (to him). 
d) Give him the pen. 
(64) AT/SPA 
a) We swam at the place where the water's deep. 
b) We swam where the water's deep. 
c) We swam at that place. 
d) We swam there. 
(65) AT/TEM 
a) We left at the time when it first got dark. 
b) We left when it first got dark. 
c) We left at that time. 




a} She' 11 be angry in the event that that happens. 
b) She'll be angry if that happens. 
c) She' 11 be angry in that event. 
d) She' 11 be angry then. 
The reader may have been puzzled at seeing "(core)" preceding the 
spaces in (59). The phenomena associated with this are the same as are 
responsible for treating the parts of (60) as respectively equivalent 
to those of (62). What is at issue here, though, is not the underlying 
similarities (e.g. adverb = pronoun) but the systematic difference. 
PP NP 
Perhaps the best approach to the topic is provided by M.A.K. 
Halliday (1970): 
The three main types of transitivity role -- process, participant, 
circumstance -- correspond, by and large, to the three major word 
(or word group) classes found in most languages: verb, noun, 
adverb. In English, typically, processes are expressed by verbal 
groups, participants by nominal groups and circumstances by adverb-
ial groups -- the last often in the form of prepositional phrases. 
(1970: 149) 
Corresponding to the three 11 transitivity roles 11 of participant, process, 
and circumstance and their respective general syntactic correlates of 
noun (or NP), verb (or Aux+ VJ, and adverb (or PP) are the three informa-
tion types as relevant to discourse structure (Joe Grimes·l974: discus-
si'on in seminar on discourse structure at SIL/North Dakota), role informa-
tion, event information, and setting informatioh.· This leads back to the 
11categorial 11 interpretation of the parts of speech: 
For Jespersen, nouns were categories·of the first degree; verbs 
(including 'adjectives') were categories of the second degree; 
and adverbs categories of the third degree. This notion of what 
we are calling 'degree' is defined in terms of the combinatorial 
properties of the categories in question. Each category is modi-
fied, in the most typical simple structures, by a category -of 'higher' 
degree. Nouns are modified by verbs (including 'adjectives'), which 
are therefore adnominal categories; verbs are modified· by adverbs, 
which are modified by adverbs, which are therefore ad-adnominal 
categories; and adverbs are modified by other adverbs. No more 
than three degrees are required for the classification of the 
parts of speech (in any language referred to by either Jespersen 
or Hjelmslev), since there is no major category whose function it 
is to modify categories of the third degree. (Lyons 1968:327-~28) 
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In his discussion of grammatical functions, Lyons (1968) starts 
off with comments on 11 nuclear 11 and 11extra-nuclear11 constituents of 
sentences: 
It is a fundamental principle of traditional grammar. and also of 
much modern syntactic theory, that every simple, declarative 
sentence consists of two obligatory major constituents, a subject 
and a predicate; and that it may contain, in addition, one or more 
adjuncts. Adjuncts (of place, time, manner, reason, etc •.. ) are 
optional, or structurally dispensable, constituents of the sen-
tences: they may be removed without affecting the remainder of 
the sentence . 
..• We will say that the subject and predicate together form the 
nucleus of the sentence. The subject and the predicate are there-
~ore nuclear, and adjuncts extranuclear, constituents. {1968:334) 
Speaking of sentence-level adjuncts and their relationship to predica-
tive complements, Lyons continues: 
The predicative complement is syntactically required, in order to 
'complete' the structure of the predicate (hence the term 'comple-
ment'). More particularly, the term 'complement' is used of such 
'adverbial' expressions as in Central Park or on Sunday in sentences 
like The parade was in Central Park or The demonstration was on 
Sunday. The temporal and locative phrases in these two sentences 
are obviously not adjuncts {since *The parade was and *The demonstra-
tion was are syntactically _incomplete}. The d1fference between an· 
adjunct and a complement is, in principle, quite clear: the former 
is an optional {extranuclear) constituent, and the latter is an 
obligatory (nuclear) constituent of the sentence. 
In practice, the distinction between sentence-adjuncts and pred-
icative complements is often far from clear. As we have just seen, 
the same class of words or phrases may occur as a locative or 
temporal adjunct in one set of sentences and as a complement (of 
the copula) in the other. This fact alone would be of small con-
sequence. But consider now a sentence like The demonstration occur-
red on Sunday. In traditional accounts of English grammar, occur 
is regarded as an intransitive verb {which, by definition, combines 
with a nominal to form a sentence-nucleus, and requires no comple-
ment). This {unlike *The demonstration was) is a complete sentence, 
and therefore that on Sunday is an adjunct. On the other hand, 
the semantic relationship between The demonstration was on Sunday 
and The demonstration occurred on Sunda* would tend to suggest 
that was and occurred are elements oft e same type, and therefore 
that onSunday is a predicative complement in both instances. 
The difference between things which appear to be adjuncts and things 
which appear to be predicative complements seems to be a difference in the 
scope of 9redication of the 11main verb 11 ; in one case, predication does 
not inclu e the AT (e.g., locative or temporal expressions); in the other 
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case, the relationship between the complex (sentential) IT and AT is 
what is being predicated. In fact, in some languages (e.g., English) the 
two different scopes may be expressed by variations in stress placement 
without the explicit verb: 
(67) The boys swam Monday afternoon (that's what happened). 
(68) The boys swam Monday afternoon (that's when). 
The conception of what is nuclear and what is extranuclear depends then 
on the scope of predication (independently of the presence of a verb on 
the surface). This difference between the predication-internal and pre-
dication-external status of AT-expressions is noted by Halliday: 
The circumstantial functions seem less central to the process than 
do the participant functions; this is related to their inability 
to take on the role of subject. But this peripheral status is not 
a feature of all circumstantial elements, which can be· subdivided 
into an 'inner' and 'outer' type. Within the function 'place', in 
(9i) he was throwing stones at the bridge 
(9ii) he was throwing stones on the bridge 
at the bridge (the 'inner type) seems more central to the process 
than on the bridge: we can say what was he throwin stones at? 
and not (in this sense) what was he doing at the bridge? on the 
other hand, we can say what was he doing on the bridge? and not 
what was he throwing stones on?) 
However, the sense of 'inner' and 'outer' is contributed to by 
various factors not all of which coincide. For example, in (10) 
the place element is obligatory in (i) but optional in (ii): 
(lOi) he put all his jewels in the wash 
(lOii) he lost all his jewels in the wash 
In (11), there is a difference of clause type; (i) is a.relational 
clause (see VII below) whereas (ii) is an action clause (Fillmore, 
from whom (11) is taken, gives this as an instance of dependency 
between functions: the place element is 'outer' if an actor is 
present and 'inner' otherwise): 
(lli) John keeps his car in the garage 
(llii) John washes his car in the garage (1970:149-150) 
As is pointed out above, Fillmore {1968:25-26) associates the 11 outer 11 and 
11 inner 11 status of locative expressions with the presence and absence of 
an Agentive expression. That this dependency relation does not hold can 
be seen in (69), where (a) is inner, (b) is outer, (c) has both, all 
without any Agentive expression {explicit or implicit): 
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(69) a. The raft floated on top of the water. 
b. The raft floated in the pool. 
c. In the pool, the raft floated on top of the water. 
Discussing the expression of location, Gruber (1965:53-55) tests 
for 11outerness 11 of phrases by using syntactic criteria such as order 
switching and preposing: 
The locative use of prepositions is possible with verbs of motion, 
however, along with the expression of goal .... the appearance of 
locative prepositions with Motional verbs must not be generated in 
construction with the verb on the prelexical level. That this is 
so can be seen by the preferred order of locative expressions and 
expressions of goal. The locative expression occurs outside the 
verb-goal complex ... 
The prepositional phrase generated in construction with the verb 
cannot be preposed. 
--- note that for the verb of motion which incorporates a locative 
expression, we have no possibility for an expression of goal ...• 
In the same way that assuming the restriction of one instance of a 
given case relation per clause leads to the analysis of certain clauses 
as complex and leads to superordinate structures in cases such as causa-
tivity and psychological experience (i.e., the postulation of SOC for 
erg and dat), we see syntactic motivation for postulating SPA as super-
ordinate on the basis of sentences represented by the above examples. 
Each of the spaces postulated so far can be supported as a neces-
sarily 11outer 11 (superordinate) realm as well as a (potential) inner 
category of movement or location. This syntactic motivation for the post-
ulation of all the spaces (except SOC, which was shown earlier in Anderson's 
work) is demonstrated below (preposing will show that we are not confus-
ing argument-internal modification with 11 two instances"): (Note that 
sentences starred here are starred only in the sense which excludes pauses) 
(70) SPA 
a) We stopped at a motel at Eau Claire. 
b) *We stopped at Eau Claire at a motel. 
c) At Eau Claire we stopped at a motel. 






a) The monthly meeting was on Tuesday last month. 
b) *The monthly meeting was last month on Tuesday. 
c) Last month the monthly meeting was on Tuesday. 
d) *On Tuesday the monthly meeting was last month. 
LOG 
a) Sam 1 ll talk your head off if you let him unless he has 
changed. 
b) *Sam 1 ll talk your head off unless he has changed if you 
let him. 
c) Unless he has changed Sam 1 ll talk your head off if you 
let him. 
d) *If you let him Sam 1 ll talk your head off unless he has 
changed. 
The above examples illustrating simultaneous instances of the same 
case/space intersection are offered as representative of syntactic evi-
dence supporting SPA, TEM, and LOG as having status·as external spaces, 
necessarily available as superordinate "housings•• of case relationships 
on the same basis as that motivating SOC. 
Notice that an "inner11 AT expression need not be of the same space 
as the outer. In fact, a single surface verb can be associated with all 
four AT 1 s: AT/AOC, AT/SPA, AT/TEM, and AT/LOG. This is demonstrated 
with an 11 inner 11 AT for each space: (The parenthesized expression will be 
the "inner" AT) 
(73) Unless he changes his mind, Joe's gonna make Carla mad 
AT/l G AT/SOC (AT/SOC) 
on the playground during recess. 
AT/SPA AT/TEM 
{74} Unless he changes his mind, Joe's gonna hide Carla's purse 
in the bushes on the playground during recess. 
(AT/SPA) 
(75) Unless he changes his mind, Joe's gonna hide Carla's purse 






Unless he chanijeS his mind, Joe's gonna hide Carla's purse 
if he can get 1t away from her on the playground during 
(AT/LOG) 
recess. 
Although the above sentences are cumbersome, they do show that it is 
possible to have in the same sentence all spaces represented as 11 outer 11 
spaces without regard to the contents of the nuclear or 11 inner 11 core 
proposition or core relation being predicated. This inner core is what 
is denoted by the terms 11 nucleus 11 or 11 core11 in the remainder of this 
paper. This core proposition may state relations in terms of any one 
of the spaces without affecting the freedom of specification of location 
in the space; the result will simply be that of 11 inner11 and 11outer11 
locations with respect to the scope of predication, i.e., the relation, 
state, process, event, proposition predicated within (or as) the core it-
self is of course merely an IT (cf. sentential NP) which itself is assoc-
iated with an AT either with or without lexicalized predication at that 
level. The absence or presence of lexicalized predication at these 
higher levels corresponds to the difference between 11 sentence adverbs 11 
of place, time, etc., and their corresponding locative and temporal 
11 predicative complements 11 • This language-specific and apparently highly 
variable (within a given language) aspect of 11 scope of predication 11 will 
be carried further later in the paper. Returning to the earlier comments 
on categorical degree, information type, transitivity functions, we can 
now say that the core, depending on the verb, may typically include in 
its scope: 
(77) I II III; 
role event setting; 
participant process circumstance; 
( 11 nominals 11 ) ( 11 verbals 11 ) ( 11 adverbials 11 )i 
where the subscript i (inner) serves to remind that only one AT (or, of 
course, FM-TO pair} relation may be represented. It should be stated 
again that in the framework proposed here that datives and ergatives are 
interpreted as adverbial and not as participant roles in the sense appar-
ently intended by Lyons, Grimes, or Lyons. The external status of human 
participants will be discussed at several points later. In short, then, 
the core consists potentially of a typically non-sentential IT, an AT of 
some sort, the verb defining and predicating the relationship, and in many 
languages (i.e., non-ergative languages) an incorporation (optional) of 
SOC together with its content. 
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3. Trees: Constituency or Dependency? 
It has been noted that constituency representations as such fail to 
characterize relationships among co-constituents and especially the 111 re-
lational1 character of cases -- the fact that they indicate the functions 
in the clause which their respective NPs contract. 11 (Anderson 1971:28) 
The relatedness of case and NP is also without direct representation. It 
is only arbitrary choice of terms that allows us to think that constitu-
ency representations (as basic rules) characterize the 11 essential, lang-
uage-independent, relationship between N and NP and between V and VP" 
(Lyons 1968:331): 
As far as the formalization of phrase-structure grammars is con-
cerned, it is a matter of 'accidental' coincidence that linguists 
will include in their grammars of different languages rules which 
always expand NP into a string of symbols containing N and rules 
which always expand VP into a string of symbols containing V. In 
other words, phrase-structure grammars fail to formalize the fact 
that NP and VP are not merely mnemonically-convenient symbols, but 
stand for sentence-constituents which are necessarily nominal and 
verbal, respectively, because they have N and Vas an obligatory 
constituent. (Lyons 1968:331) 
Fillmore's alternative to constituency rules as discussed above is 
the introduction of NP together with some co-constituent (e.g. preposi-
tion) as a constituent of case, i.e., with case as a dominating node 
(Fillmore 1968:32-33). Although this does in some sense with its domin-
ating case node capture the relational nature of case, it introduced con-
fusion of categorical and functional labels as constituency nodes. The 
use of a nonterminal case node not only induced confusion of categorical 
and relational labels in what remains essentially a constituency tree, 
but requires the further case-sensitive terminal co-constituent with NP. 
In this paper I shall assume dependency representation instead of 
strict constituency representation; this will allow·a fairly direct re-
presentation of the relational nature of the verb: 
Pre-terminal categories have been eliminated, and in place of the 
constituency relationship, the categories are 1 hierarchized 1 with 
respect to dependency. Loe and nom are dependent on V (which thus 
overns them); and they each have dependent on them (i.e., they 
govern a N. Thus, the case elements can be interpreted quite 
naturally as expressing the relation contracted between their 
dependent Ns and the governing V (which replaces the Cl [''clause", 
cf. S:LGD)] of the constituency grammar), and they are nevertheless 
terminal categories. The governing (and 'hyper-relational') posi-
tion of V within the clause can be justified in various ways, 
including in particular that as such it will be assigned the clause 
subcategorization rules -- which allow for the various combinations 
of cases, among other things -- and it would be necessary anyway 
to subcategorize verbs with regard to the cases they co-occur with 
.•. In this way, too, the essentially relational (notional) role of 
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Vis contrasted with the basically 'thing'-referential Nl (which 
governs in underlying representations only by recursion). 
1cf.: 'nouns are primary, in the sense that they are linked refer-
entially with 11 things 11 (in the 'nuclear' instances)' (Lyons, 1966 
:230). It is possible to accomodate this •referential primacy• of 
nouns without acceding to Lyons• subsequent argument concerning the 
purely surface centrality of the verb. Within the dependency 
framework outlined here, verbs (or 'predicators') and nouns are 
1 basic 1 with regard to different aspects of the semantic represent-
ation. Verbs are central relationally: they govern the case 
functions contracted by nouns. Nouns are primary referentially 
(and perhaps selectionally -- but Seuren, 1969: 3.2.2); they ter-
minate (non-recursive) dependency trees. (Anderson 1971: 30-31) 
One of the many consequences of eliminating non-terminal categories is 
that negation at any node corresponds to a unique scope of negation (cf. 
the scope of negation of Sand the scope V or VP in constituency trees). 
Dependency representations will be seen to allow a clear-cut repre-
sentational (formal) distinction between categorical and relational nodes 
in the following sense: case relation labels are the only 11 nodes 11 which 
can never branch. Further, case relation labels can never be terminal 
in the sense that they never occur except between V and N; in effect, 
then, the case relation 11 nodes 11 are branch labels. The Snode ii1 a 
constituency tree corresponds roughly to the scope of a V node in a 
dependency tree; constituent NP has a scope corresponding to that of the 
scope of a N node in a dependency tree, i.e., the node together with all 
that depends. 
Because underlying structures are assumed to have the properties 
of dependency representations, they will be represented as such without 
reference to whatever problems may exist in reference any apparent 11 neecf1 
for constituency representation at or near the surface in derivations; my 
assumption here is that constituency representation is derivable (automa-
tically) as output of the principles of linearization as they apply to 
dependencies. This will be discussed in some detail when we discuss 
ordering. (The pertinent literature which was used for the above para-
graphs should be mentioned now: Anderson 1971:27-31; Chomsky 1965:63-74, 
106-107; Fillmore 1968:87-88, 1971a; Lyons 1968:230-231, 234-235, 330-333) 
The sentences below will be used to illustrate in a rough way the 
contrast between constituency and dependency trees: 
(78) a. static location clause (=(31)): 
My brother is in Colorado 
b. movement clause (non-ergative version of (40)): 
The marble rolled from the doorway to the far wall. 
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c. act (ergative) clause (=(40)): 
He rolled the marble from the doorway to the far wall. 
d. experience clause (=(45)): 
Barry learned that his car had been towed away. 
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As far as possible, we will exclude discussi"on of anything strictly 
internal to NP. This follows from the purpose and scope of this paper. 
Also, it is a sneaky accomodation to the assumption (e.g., as expressed 
in Frantz 1974) that predicates relate indices, as opposed to the ling-
uistic specifications making up NP's as arguments. I will not argue for 
this now; my limited exposure to the issue consists of verbal conunents 
by Joe Grimes on the separate handling in terms of discourse structure 
of "reference" and "identification" (SIL/University of North Dakota, 
1974). However, we will continue to use the terms V and.N rather than 
switch to predicate and argument (index) exclusively. 
The value of dependency representation will become quite clear 
when we relate phenomena and make predictions concerning {word and/or 
affix) order in natural languages with respect to a principle captured in 
part by dependency representation of underlying. structures, the principle 
of linkage iconicity. · 
4. IT and AT as In and Out 
Space order as diagramed in (59) is misrepresented in two ways. 
First, the "stack" is upside down, in that the progression of superord-
ination from the core is SOC+SPA+TEM+LOG and not the other way around or 
any other permutation of the four. Second, and perhaps even less obvious-
ly significant, the space stack (even if "turned right sid~ up") fails 
to characterize the fully e1odeictic nature of the hierarchy involved. The significance of this wi 1 become clear in following pages; the pre-
paratory stop for the moment is to change our representation of the space 
hierarchy to one which more directly shows its essentially nonlinear 
nature: the spaces are not ordered up, down, left, or right; their order-
ing is inward/outward. When we make predictions concerning particle, 
word, phrase, and case orders in natural languages, and again when we 
attempt to show the way to motiva_tion of the space hierarchy on the basis 
of facts of cognitive development entirely apart from linguistics-internal 
considerations, the crucial importance of the difference between (59) and 






The strict localistic framework adopted here restricts the domain 
of a simple verb to the relations IT and AT (AT being realized as a 
pathway defined in terms of FM and/or TO when the verb is transitional). 
The two elements IT and AT can be linearized in only two ways, of course: 
IT+AT and AT+IT. We shall assume that the choice of ordering will be con-
sistent throughout superordination, i.e. "up through" the spaces, in 
underlying structures. This assumption will find strong support in the 
restricted nature and the empirical success of the predictions which it 
makes possible. Given this assumption, then, our consideration is limited 
to the superordination patterns of (82) and (83): 
(82) IT-AT: 
















If there are only two possible patterns of superordination available 
for characterizing all natural languages, then it follows that any given 
natural language has either an IT-AT or an AT-IT embedding structure. In 
other words, we are assuming that every language is at root either an 
AT-IT language or an IT-AT language, all the way out through the spaces. 
On the basis of the characterization of a given natural language as 
either AT-IT (AI) or IT-AT (IA), a set of predictions of wide scope and 
generality is made possible. For example, the characterization makes 
possible predictions concerning the order of sentence adverbials with 
respect to each other and with respect to the "nuclear'' clause, the rela-
tive order of main and complex clauses in complex sentences. In short, 
from knowing whether a language is AI or IA one can make predictions con-
cerning case-order as case has been defined here (relation-space conjunc-
tion). Such predictions will be made more specific after some intervening 
preparation when we spell out the principle of egodeictic iconicity. 
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5. Three Principles 
The foregoing preparation gives us some basis now for showing that 
the apparatus suggested for revising certain aspects of case grammar 
systems has interesting implications elsewhere. A wide range of general-
izations concerning the order of elements in strings will be character-
ized in terms of/by three principles. Some of the generalizations are 
well known and recognized in the literature as not too controversial. 
In the case of such generalizations our principles will give a unified 
account of diverse phenomena. Other generalizations will be regarded 
as predictions the empirical testing of which remains forthcoming. 
For each postulated principle (intervening variable), we will try 
to define a set of linguistic phenomena to which it gives characteriza-
tion (or about which it embodies predictions) (dependent variables) and 
the independent variables which are pertinent. 
The three 11 principles 11 (I don't know what else to call them) are 
egodeictic iconicity, linkage iconicity, and temporal iconicity. The 
first, egodeictic iconicity, has to do with the space hierarchy as dia-
ijramed in (81) and the dichotomized superordination patterns of (82) and 
(83). The assumption that a language will be either an AI language or 
an IA language together with the assumption that (81) correctly character-
izes a language-independent hierarchy of the four spaces external to the 
nucleus allows us to make predictions of two kinds. First, the hierarchy 
of remoteness characterizes a universally underlying 11 natural ". ordering 
relationship which holds among all extranuclear elements, such as simple 
sentence adverbs, simple prepositional phrases, subordinate clauses,.and 
11 complex PP" (1 i sted in (62) and i 11 ustrated in (63)-(66)), associated 
with a single verb in surface structure. In AT-IT languages, conditional 
expressions precede time expressions; time expressions, in turn, precede 
place expressions; expressions of locations precede dative or ergative 
expressions (certain exceptions to the SOC-last prediction for ordering wi 
will be shown to be systematic and will at least partially be characterized 
in discussion of temporal iconicity). In IT-AT languages such as English, 
the syntactically 11 unmarked 11 order for such expressions is: dative and 
ergative expressions precede expressions of spatial location; place ex-
pressions precede temporal expressions; temporal expressions precede 
conditionals. One difference between IA and AI language sets is that IA 
languages show freedom in preposing of certain AT-expressions, while.AI 
languages show a high rigidity in the corresponding post-posing. The 
preposing allowable in IT-AT languages such as English and Vietnamese 
shows systematicity in two interesting ways: 1) if one of several AT/ 
spacen expressions is preposed, it must be th.at of the 11outermost 11 
space; 2) if more than one·AT~expression be preposed in the same sentence 
then the preposed expressions will be ordered as though in an AI language 
i.e., 11 inward 11 rather than 11 outward 11 • 
While egodeictic iconicity characterizes certain facts concerning 
the ordering relations which hold 1) among extra-nuclear AT-expressions 
(adverbs, simple PP's, subordinate clauses of condition, time, place, etc. 
and "complex PP 1s 11 ) and 2) between such elements and the nuclear clause 
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(core), the principle of linkage iconicity characterizes the order of 
the verb with respect to the remainder of the string in the underlying 
representation of a sentence. 
It has been argued (Mccawley 1970) that every language is either 
predicate-initial or predicate-final in underlying structures. Since 
then both predicate-initial (bach 1972) and predicate-final (Ross 1973; 
see also Koutsoudas and Sanders 1974) orders have been proposed as uni-
versal. As far as I know, no one has seriously posited NP-V-NP as a 
universal order for underlying representations of natural-language 
sentences. 
The dependency representations in (80.b-d) illustrate the (perhaps 
offensively) simple and straightforward notion of linkage iconicity: 
the case-relation non-nodes occupy a position (set of positions) between 
the relater-predicator (verb) and each associated 11 related 11 (i.e., argu-
ment, index, NP), with the exception of whichever NP happens to have been 
selected as sentential subject; typically for English, IT-expressions do 
not show prepositional case marking. The case-relation marking, under-
lying equivalent to a branch label, is assumed in effect to "remain 
attached" to the argument (index, NP) the predicate (verb), or. to both 
(e.g. as in topicalization processes in Philippine languages such as 
Maranao, Kalagan). The case-relation marking, whether manifested as mark-
ing on NP or V or both, is assumed to come from and remain between the 
two related (i.e. case-related) terms (V, NP); this is part of what is 
meant by linkage iconicity. In that case-relation marking may manifest 
itself as a combination of inflection, word order, pre- or post-positions, 
etc., the relevance of this principle must not be obscured by confusion 
of case-relation manifestation with 11 NP-internal 11 relations which may be 
manifested in some languages with the same manifestation type (e.g. pre-
positions in English) as case relations or in other languages (e.g. 
Chinese) by a clearly separate type. Note in the following examples how 
the use of prepositions for both 11deep case" and argument-internal rela-
tions in English corresponds to potentially (I claim underlying) and, 
in Chinese, actually disparate status: 
(84) a. I'll walk into the study 
.J V '\ - / b. wo zou dao shufang -li 
I walk to study -in(side) 
v V '\ - / V ' c. wo zou dao shufang -de limian 
I walk to study 's inside 
The underlined morphs in each case represent the case relation TO. 
This separation of case and NP-internal relations, evidenced in 
(SO.a) by not giving the in of in Colorado representation as marking AT-
ness, can of course be seen clearly in many cases in English. Notice that 
the -li of (84.b) is a postposition, while its 11 unabbreviated 11 counterpart 
in (84.c), limian, is a full noun modified by the noun shufan~. We see 
a roughly equivalent mechanism in the English sentence in (85: 
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(85) a. I walk to the front (side) of the desk. 
v..,.' - / '\ 
b. wo zou dao zhuozi -de qianmian 
I walk to desk 's front(side) 
This is not the place to go into detail, but there is an interest-
ing area of intuitive support for the "neutral" or at least "not-primarily-
adnominal" status of case relations as characterized in our dependency 
representations and by the principle of linkage iconicity; the under-
lined d~o together with the other few 11 case11 prepositions (also called 
"co-verbs") of Mandarin is analyzed by some as part of the preceding verb 
which then takes the following NP as direct object, by others as a· true 
preposition belonging to the following NP, making it in effect a PP. 
The third principle, temporal iconicity, is too simple and straight-
forward to require much discussion until we observe its interaction with 
the other two. The idea behind the label "temporal iconicity" is that 
sequence in linguistic representation is assumed to reflect sequence in 
cognitive experiences. On the gross level of narrative discourse, the 
sequence of events corresponds of course to the sequence of events refer-
enced. Any deviation is interpreted either as incompetence or error on 
the part of the encoder (e.g. "Oh, I forgot to tell you that before he 
did that he had ... ") or as a special literary effect (e.g. the flashback). 
On a lower level we have the widely noted phenomenon of "serial verbs" in 
strings. On still another level we have the phenomenon documented as 
Greenberg's first universal: 
1. In declarative sentences with nominal subject and object, the 
dominant order is almost always one in which the subject precedes 
the object. (1963) 
Assuming the nominal subject here referred to to typically be the Agent 
and the nominal object to be the Patient in clauses the verb of which is 
causative, we have the basis of transitivity" of process: the temporal 
sequence of state-chains (events) linked by causality. Until we are 
ready to look at temporal iconicity in terms of interaction with the 
other two principles, we shall settle for the following observation by 
Greenberg: 
The order of elements in language parallels that in physical exper-
ience or the order of knowledge. In the instance of conditionals, 
although the truth relationi involved are timeless, logicians have 
always symbolized in the order implying, implied exactly as in 
spoken language. If modus ponens is used in proof, then we have a 
pragmatic example which follows the order of reasoning. No one 
thinks to write a proof backwards. (1966:331) 
From the three principles introduced in the preceding pages it is claimed 




a. egodeictic iconicity (EI): order of extranuclear elements 
both among themselves and with respect to the nucleus or 
core; 
b. linkage iconicity (LI): order of the verb or predicate with 
respect to its associated arguments; 
c. temporal iconicity (TI): order of nuclear elements (i.e., 
core-internal arguments~ non-adverbial nominals) among them-
selves. 
From certain interactions among the above principles it is speculated that 
mapping of deep case relation to surface case form can be shown to be sys-
tematically derived, together with subject-choice hierarchy phenomena. 
6. Principles and Predictions 
FIVE MAJOR FACTORS DlTERMINING THE ORDER OF ELEMENTS AND SUBSTRINGS IN 
LINGUISTIC REPRESENTATION: 
I. EGODEICTIC ICONICITY: Order outward (e.g. from head of construction 
in syntax or from base in morphology) reflects sequence of acqui-
sition which itself reflects sequence in cognitive development .. 
II. TEMPORAL ICONICITY: Sequence in linguistic representation reflects 
sequence in nonlinguistic cognitive experience. 
III. LINKAGE ICONICITY: An element relating or 11 linking 11 two tenns is 
shown in strings to do so by its being ordered between the two tenns, 
linking them in notation trees as well as in surface strings. 
IV. DISCOURSE STRUCTURE: The degree to which a given natural language 
shows free variation in word order is nothing more or less than 
its degree of sensitivity to either topical structure or informa-
tion structure or both. 
V. MODEL STRINGS: Those facts of word order which are truly arbitrary 
and can be derived only from model strings can be derived in a fair-
ly straightforward manner from the answers to a sequence of at most 
four questions. 
APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLES TO WORD ORDER: 
I. EGODEICTIC ICONICITY (EI) makes predictions about (or dictates) the 
order of material both inside and outside the (extended) nucleus: 
A. NUCLEAR INTEGRITY (EINur.) dictates that the innennost IT (e.g. the 
direct object or patient NP) always be contiguous to its verb in 





THE SPACE HIERARCHY (EI ) dictates that, in languages where there 
is an only order (or ev~~ an order widely agreed upon as 11 unmarked 11 ) 
of extranuclear elements (things adverbial), the order of expres-
sions will correspond to SOC+SPA+TEM+LOG in IA languages and to 
LOG+TEM+SPA+SOC in AI languages. 
SPACE ORDER CONSISTENCY (EicoNSORD) dictates that a given language 
may be underlyingly IA or AI out not a mixture of one with respect 
to some spaces and the other with respect to other spaces; that is 
the case relations must be projected consistently out through the 
space hierarchy 11 leftward 11 or 11 rightward 11 • 
II. TEMPORAL ICONICITY dictates the order of material both inside and 




FROM BEFORE TO (TifT) dictates that, internal to a space, expres-
sions of source (FMJ must precede expressions of goal (TO). 
ERGATIVE BEFORE DATIVE (Tis1) is in one sense a special case of 
TIFT= speaking in terms of locational distribution, the dative 
(TO/SOC) is properly included in the 11 in the world 11 or "NOT IN FM/ 
SOC 11 which strictly speaking is the TO/SOC of the ergative FM/SOC; 
likewise the ergative (or agentive) FM/SOC is properly included in 
the 11 in the world" or 11 NOT IN TO/SOC 11 corresponding to the dative 
TO/SOC. Thus ergative expressions (S) are ordered before .dative 
expressions (I) by temporal iconicity. 
ACTOR BEFORE PATIENT (AGENT BEFORE OBJECT) (Tiso) dictates that 
the causally linked Agentive (Actor) and Object be ordered to pre-
serve their order of involvement (via the event (or event chain)) 
which links them. 
III. LINKAGE ICONICITY (LI) makes predictions concerning material within 
and without the nucleus: 
A. 
B. 
NOUN-VERB-NOUN (LINvN) predicts that a predicate which relates two 
terms will show up between them in surface structures, dictating 
so in deep (logical) structures. 
PATHWAY FILLING (LIFIT or LIFM+IT+TO) places a theme (IT) on its 
pathway between source (FM) and goal (TO), predicting in effect 
SOI or 105 to be favored over OSI, OIS, SIO, or ISO. 
IV. DISCOURSE STRUCTURE (OS) is at some points difficult to isolate 
from Tl, but is sensitive to factors which are specific to discourse, 
such as staging or such as cohesion; discourse structure considerations 





TOPICAL STRUCTURE {DSTs) dictates that the 11 topic 11 {theme or title) 
not be surrounded by other NP's but be 11outside11 the others. 
(Usually this is a matter of being to the front, but it seems that 
in some cases topic may follow.) 
INFORMATION STRUCTURE (DS1s) dictates that 11 old information 11 (either 
previously made explicit earlier in the discourse or otherwise 
assumed by the encoder to be known (or at least uniquely recoverable) 
to the decoder) precede 11 new information 11 , which tends to be marked 
not only by order but also by grammatical explicitness and other 
devices such as stress (Halliday 1970, Kunc 1971). 
V. MODEL STRINGS (MS) provide answers to an ordered set of questions 
which in any one natural language number four at most: 
A. OV OR VO? (or, more strictly, ITV or V IT?) (VO?) 
1. If OV, then no more questions are necessary, for the other 
principles are enough to derive without ambiguity a single order: 
NSIOV (note Sa). 
2. If VO, then the next question is asked. 
B. VS OR SV? (SV?) 
1. If VS, then EI and TI clash, necessitating for this language a 
third and final question: 
a. WHO WINS, EI OR TI? (OS?) 
1. If SO (TI wins), then the principles dictate VSOIN, 
and EI avenges itself with a universally dictated alter-
nate order which satisfies it as well as TI: SVOIN 
(note Sb). 
2. If OS (EINUC wins), then the principles dictate VOSIN 
(note Sc). 
2. If SV, then the next question is asked. 
C. IO OR 01? (01?) 
1. If IO, then the principles dictate NSIVO (note Sd). 
2. IF 01, then the last question is asked. 
D. NI OR IN? (IN?) is in effect asking 11 AT-IT or IT-AT? 11 
1. If NI, then we get NSVOI. 
2. If IN, then we get SVOIN. 
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VINOS IVNOS INVOS INOVS INOSV 
VINSO IVNSO INVSO INSVO INSOV 
VIONS I VONS IOVNS IONVS IONSV 
VIOSN IVOSN IOVSN IOSVN IOSNV 
VISNO IVSNO ISVNO SINVO ISNOV 
VISON IVSON ISVON ISOVN ISONV 
VNIOS NVIOS NIVOS NIOVS NIOSV 
VNISO NVISO NIVSO NISVO NISOV 
VNOIS NVOIS NOVIS NOIVS NOISV 
VNOSI NVOSI NOVSI NOSVI NOSIV 
VNSIO NVSIO NSVIO NSIVO NSIOV 
VNSOI NVSOI NSVOI NSOVI NSOIV 
VOINS OVINS OIVNS OINVS OINSV 
VOISN OVISN OIVSN OISVN OISNV 
VONIS OVNIS ONVIS ONIVS ONISV 
VONS! OVNSI ONVSI ONSVI ONSIV 
VOSIN OVSIN OSVIN OSIVN OSINV 
VOSNI OVSNI OSVNI OSNVI OSNIV 
VSINO SVINO SIVNO SINVO SINOV 
VSION SVION SIVON SIOVN SIONV 
VSNIO SVNIO SNVIO SNIVO SNIOV 
VSNOI SVNOI SNVOI SNOVI SNOIV 
VSOIN SVOIN SOVIN SOIVN SOINV 
VSONI SVONI SOVNI SONVI SONIV 
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SURVIVORS: TISI 60/120 = 1/2 
----- ----- ----- ----- -----
----- ----- ----- ----- -----
----- ----- ----- ----- -----
----- ----- ----- ----- -----
----- ----- -----=- ----- -----
----- ----- ----- ----- -----
----- ----- ----- ----- -----
----- ----- ----- ----- -----
----- ----- ----- ----- -----
VNOSI NVOSI NOVSI NOSVI NOSIV 
VNSIO NVSIO NSVIO NSIVO NSIOV 
VNSOI NVSOI NSVOI NSOVI NSOIV 
----- ----- ----- ----- -----
----- ----- ----- ----- -----
----- ----- ----- ----- -----
VONSI OVNSI ONVSI ONSVI ONSIV 
VOSIN OVSIN OSVIN OSIVN OSINV 
VOSNI OVSNI OSVNI OSNVI OSNIV 
VSINO SVINO SIVNO SINVO SINOV 
VSION SVION SIVON SIOVN SIONV 
VSNIO SVNIO SNVIO SNIVO SNIOV 
VSNOI SVNOI SNVOI SNOVI SNOIV 
VSOIN SVOIN SOVIN SOIVN SOINV 
VSONI SVONI SOVNI SONVI SONIV 
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SURVIVORS: EICONSORD 40/120 = 1/3 
----- ----- ----- ----- -----
----- ----- ----- ----- -----
----- ----- ----- ----- -----
VIOSN IVOSN IOVSN IOSVN IOSNV 
----- ----- ----- ----- -----
----- ----- ----- ----- -----
VNIOS NVIOS NIVOS NIOVS NIOSV 
VNISO NVISO NIVSO NISVO NISOV 
----- ----- ----- ----- -----
----- ----- ----- ----- -----
VNSIO NVSIO NSVIO NSIVO NSIOV 
VNSOI NVSOI NSVOI NSOVI NSOIV 
----- ----- ----- ----- -----
VOISN OVIS1J OIVSN OISVN OISNV 
----- ----- ----- ----- -----
----- ----- ----- ----- -----
VOSIN OVSIN OSVIN OSIVN OSINV 
----- ----- ----- ----- -----
----- ----- ----- ----- -----
----- ----- ----- ----- -----
----- ----- ----- ----- -----
----- ----- ----- ----- -----
VSOIN SVOIN SOVIN SOIVN SOINV 
----- ----- ----- ----- -----
SIL-UND Workpapers 1975
128 -
SURVIVORS: TISI AND EicoNSORD {BOTH EXCEPTIONLESS) 
----- ----- ----- ----- -----
.. ---- ----- ----- ----- -----
------ ----- ----- ----- ------
----- ----- ----- ----- -----
----- ----- ----- ----- -----
----- ----- ----- ----- -----
.. ---- ----- ----- ----- -----
----- ----- ----- ----- -----
----- ----- ----- ----- -----
----- ----- ----- ----- -----
VNSIO NVSIO NSVIO NSIVO NSIOV 
VNSOI NVSOI NSVOI NSOVI NSOIV 
----- ----- ----- ----- -----
----- ----- ----- ----- -----
----- ----- ----- ----- -----
----- ----- ----- ----- --ca--
VOSIN OVSIN OSVIN OSIVN OSINV 
----- ----- ----- ----- -----
----- ----- ----- ----- -----
----- ----- ----- ----- -----
----- ----- ----- ----- -----
----- ----- ----- ----- -----
VSOIN SVOIN SOVIN SOIVN SOINV 
----- ----- ----- ----- -----
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SURVIVORS: TISO 60/120 = 1/2 
----- ----- ----- .. ____ -----
VINSO IVNSO INVSO INSVO INSOV 
----- ----- ----- ----- ----·· 
----- ----- ----- ----- -----
VISNO IVSNO ISVNO ISNVO ISNOV 
VISON IVSON ISVON ISOVN ISONV 
----- ----- ----- ----- -----
VNISO NVISO NIVSO NISVO NISOV 
----- ----- ----- ----- -----
----- ----- ----- ----- -----
VNSIO NVSIO l~SVIO NSIVO NSIOV 
VNSOI NVSOI NSVOI NSOVI 1rnorv 
----- ----- ----- ----- -----
----- ----- ----- ----- -----
----- ----- ----- ----- -----
----- ----- ----- ----- -----
----- ----- ----- ----- -----
----- ----- ----- ----- -----
VSINO SVINO SIVJ)JO SINVO SilIOV 
VSION SVION SIVON SIOVN SIONV 
VSNIO SVNIO SNVIO SlUVO SNIOV 
VSNOI SVNOI SNVOI SNOVI Sl'iOIV 
VSOIN SVOIN SOVIN SOIVU SOINV 
VSONI SVONI SOVNI NONVI SONIV 
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SURVIVORS: EINUC 48/120 = 2/5 
----- ----- INVOS INOVS -----
----- ----- ----- INSVO INSOV 
----- !VONS IOVNS ----- -----
----- IVOSN IOVSN ----- -----
----- ----- ----- ISNVO ISNOV 
----- ----- ISVON ISOVN -----
----- ----- NIVOS NIOVS -----
----- ----- ----- NISVO NISOV 
----- NVOIS NOVIS ----- -----
----- NVOSI NOVSI ----- -----
----- ----- ----- NSIVO NSIOV 
----- ----- NSVOI NSOVI -----
VOINS OVINS ----- ----- -----
VOISN OVISN ----- ----- -----
VONIS OVNIS ----- ----- -----
VONS! OVNSI ----- ----- -----
VOSIN OVSIN ----- ----- -----
VOS1\°I OVS1H ----- ----- -----
----- ----- ----- SINVO SINOV 
----- ----- SIVON SIOVN --... ~-
----- ----- ----- SNIVO SNIOV 
----- ----- SNVOI SNOVI -----
----- SVOIN SOVIN ----- -----
----- SVONI SOVNI ----- -----
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SURVIVORS: EICONSORD~ EINUC' TISI' AND Tiso 6/120 1/20 
----- ----- ----- -----
----- ----- ----- -----
----- ----- ----- -----
----- ----- ----- -----
----- ----- ----- ----- -----
----- --a.c:;i- ----- -----
----- ----- ----- -----
----- ----- ----- -----
----- ----- ----- -----
----- ----- ----- -----
----- ----- NSIVO NSIOV 
----- NSVOI NSOVI -----
----- ----- ----- -----
----- ----- ----- ----- -----
----- ----- ----- -----
----- ----- ----- ----- -----
----- ----- ----- ----- -----
----- ----- ----- -----
----- ----- ----- -----
----- ----- ----- -----
----- ----- ----- ----- -----
----- ----- ----- ----- -----
SVOIN SOVIN ----- -----
----- ----- ----- -----
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EICON Eii~UC TI:-n Tiso LINVN LIFIT 
NSIOV + + + + 
NSIVO + + + + + 
NSVOI + + + + + + 
SVOIN + + + + + + 
VSOIN + + + + 
VOSIN + + + 
NSOVI + + + + + 
SOVIN + + + + + 
Assuming that the first six orders represented above do occur as 
only or unmarked orders in natural languages, and that the bottom two do 
not, one might expect that the 11 good 11 orders be valued more highly than 
the 11 bad 11 ones below. However, with respect to the two major principles 
which are appropriate to the ordering considerations of the moment, i.e., 
EI and TI, two 11 good 11 orders (VSOIN and VOSIN) fail to satisfy the prin-
ciples fully while two 11 bad 11 orders (NSOVI and SOVIN) do satisfy the same 
principles fully. 
Also, why should it be that the conjunction of EI with TI admits 
just the right number of survivors (six orders out of one hundred twenty 
possible orders) and yet excludes the two 11 good 11 orders (VSOIN and VOSlN) 
in favor of the two 11 bad 11 ones? 
If, as pointed out in Greenberg 1 s Universal One and in the remarks 
immediately preceding it, VOS order is so rare in contrast to vso·, SVO, 
and SOV that it is to be discounted for general purposes (it violates TI), 
then why should it be found at all? And why should it be that one and 
only one of the three remaining orders (i.e., VSO) is characterized by 
always having at least one alternate order (SV), as noted in Greenberg 1 s 
Universal Six? 
Perhaps the reader has noticed that the two somewhat 11 defective 11 
orders, VOS and VSO(i.e. VOSIN and VSOIN), have in common the fact that 
they are verb-initial; and further, they differ only in the matter of SO 
versus OS. The significance of these obvious observations becomes trans-
parently clear when we consider that it is only in the case of verb-
initial languages that there could ever be any conflict whatsoever in the 
orders dictated by EI and TI (i.e., EINuc and Tis0). If the verb is· 
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initial, then it will be impossible to satisfy both temporal iconicity 
and the nuclear integrity which is dictated by EI. Given that all three 
logically possible positions for verbs (with respect to Sand 0) are 
realized, then it cannot be surprising that any order violating temporal 
iconicity (e.g. VOS) should be very rare, and that the other verb-initial 
order (VSO, which violates nuclear integrity in favor of temporal iconi-
city) should have without exception among languages of the world an alter-
nate order which, also satisfying temporal iconicity, restores nuclear 
integrity: SVO. Thus it is seen that what at first glance appears to 
be random exceptions to predictions made by the principles is really a 
remarkable reflection of the unique point of predictive clash between EI 
and TI which explains in a certain sense the distributional rarity of the 
one order (VOS) and the universal and unique alternant (SV) of the other 
(VSO). 
To return to the questions of two pages earlier, how could the con-
junction of EI and TI have allowed as survivors.the two orders that "do 
not belong"? This question brings to mind two obvious possibilities. 
First, perhaps the principles are correct and our information concerning 
what orders do and do not occur as basic is false. Second, it may be 
that our facts are correct but the principles wrong. As far as I can 
tell at this time, both the principles and the facts. are correct. This 
leads us then to reconsider the question in a new way. So far we have 
been discussin9 the principles as though they were operating upon (i.e. 
selecting from) the full set of the 120 logically possible orders of the 
full set of 5 elements types (S, 0, I, V, NT). It will be remembered, 
however, that the intended interpretation of the principles was original-
ly not so much to perform a simultaneous selection from all possible 
orders of the full set of elements as it was to predict or dictate the 
development of those orders which do occur in terms of the options 
available at each given point in the acquisition of that set. 
It is predicted by the space hierarchy of EI and reported by ob-
servers of acquisition (e.g. Dale 1972:50, lines 1-3) that the use of 
nouns as Object (Patient) precedes the use of nouns as Agent (Actor). It 
is also reported that in early speech the most common of the various N + 
N constructions is the Agent+ Object (Dale 1972:46-48 lines 21-23). 
These facts, taken together with a principle which we iitlight call NON (NOW 
OR NEVER), lead to a natural explanation of the non-occurrence of the two 
orders which appear to satisfy EI and TI, NSOVI and SOVIN. The reader 
will remember that the sequence of acquisition is that of OV or VO, then 
the Agentive Subject (S), and then I and NT. Although the essence of the 
NOW OR NEVER principle is better captured in the visual representation 
below, it can be stated as follows: 
If the verb is either initial or final after the acquisition of S, 
then the verb will remain so throughout the acquisition of basic 
order; the remainder of order acquisiton will then be uniquely 
dictated by EI. 
Remembering that acquisition of Sis in effect acquisition of 11 N number 
two", we have a visual representation of the NON principle at work: 
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TIME] VN VN VN VN NV NV NV NV 
(V,O 
TIME2 NVN NVN VNN VNN NNV NNV NVN NVN 
(+S) 
TIME3 NVNN NNVN VNNN *NVNN NNNV *NNVN NNVN NVNN 
(+I or NT) 
In cases where the acquisition of S leaves the verb neither initial nor 






TI, AND NON 
----- ----- ----- ----- -----
----- ----- ----- ----- -----
----- ----- ----- ----- -----
----- ----- ----- ----- -----
----- ----- ----- ----- -----
----- ----- ----- ----- -----
----- ----- ----- ----- -----
----- ----- ----- ----- -----
----- ----- ----- ----- -----
----- -----· ----- ----- -----
----- ----- ----- NSIVO NSIOV 
----- ----- NSVOI ----- -----
----- ----- ----- ----- -----
----- ----- --mi--- ----- -----
----- ----- ----- ----- -----
----- ----- ----- ----- -----
(¥Qelli) ----- ----- ----- -----
----- ----- ----- ----- -----
----- ----- ----- ----- -----
----- ----- ----- ----- -----
----- ----- ----- ----- -----
----- ----- ----.. ----- -----
(¥.SG~~) SVOIN ----- ----- -----
----- ----- ----- ----- -----
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It mi9ht be noted that interactions of the first three principles 
(EI, TI, LI} derives the extended nucleus (S(O}I} which yields a left-
to-right characterization of the hierarchy of terms I, II, and Ill (gram-
matical relations subject, object, and indirect object} as discussed in 
Perlmutter and Postal 1 s relational grammar (LSA 1974), and furthers 
characterizes everything else as non-term by virtue of extranuclearity. 
Inasmuch as the principles specify or characterize 11 possible word 
order 11 they provide limits not only to linguistic variation (synchronic} 
at this level but also of course to linguistic change (diachronic}; it 
is speculated that the principles will be instrumental in describing and 
perhaps to some extent explaining certain patterns of _change in word order 
through time. One example of what I envision as explanatory applications 
of the principles is their order, which I take to represent as reflecting 
the sequences of 11 decisions 11 in the language acquisition of every native 
speaker of a natural language. Presumably dialects of a same language 
(and likewise different stages of a language through time} should vary 
11 one step at a time 11 , i.e., one 11 decision 11 or 11 question 11 at a time. 
Possible evidence for productive research in this direction is seen in 
the fact that Mandarin Chinese and Cantonese (both SVO) differ syntact-
ically precisely in their different answers to 01? together wjth facts 
derived specifically from this (or at least related to it); thus Mandarin 
is NSIVO and Cantonese is NSVOI; both are VO, both SV, both AT-IT. 
Another interesting set of language facts which may to some extent 
be explained in terms of the principles and especially interaction between 
two of the principles is exemplified by the so-called passive in IT-AT 
languages. Temporal iconicity and Linkage iconicity are satisfied in the 
11active sentences 11 , while the passives satisfy the dictates of IT-AT 
consistency (El) to the fullest. This area of contradictory mandates 
between the two major principles (EI and TI) defines an area of variation 
in English and in numerous other languages as well. To simply say that 
passive is a matter of topicalization of the Object is to ignore two 
questions: first, if passivization is object topicalization, then why 
should it be so easy to topicalize the Object without the passive con-
struction? Second, and less trivial, is the question of verb agreement 
which asks why verb agreement changes only with 11 topicalization 11 of 
Objects and with nothing else. This variation of construction (active-
passive) is at least in some weak sense explained by the fact that each 
satisfies the set of ordering principles in some way that the other can-
not (cf. the alternation of SVO with VSO in VSO languages and the cor-
responding clash of predictionssof El and Tl}. 
Representative of the diversity of phenomena which yield to unitary 
characterization in terms of egodeictic iconicity are such things as the 
distribution of the Jinghpaw (Kachin} postposition ~· In traditional 
dictionaries (and, presumably grammars} there are at least three entries 
ea~h spelled~ and each pronounced with the same distinctive tone 
[ya9]. One is a loose sort of locative postposition which is used to 
designate location or place; another is used as a postposition for ex-
pressing location in time as opposed to space, 11when 11 instead of 11where 11 • 
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The third is called a subjunctive conjunction corresponding to the 11 if 11 
in conditionals. It is of some interest that each of the "three ~'s" 
can occur either after a noun phrase or after a subordinate clause (i.e. 
is in effect both postposition to NP and subordinating conjunction to S) 
and that both uses obtain for SPA, for TEM, and for LOG. Further, as a 
postposition to NP it may follow a series of additional postpositions of 
location, etc. This set of phenomena yields easily to direct character-
ization in terms of EI; Yan1 in Jinghpaw is simply a direct realization of extranuclear AT (extranuc ear in the sense that it does not freely 
occur with AT/SOf:; in the innermost space which is, except in so-called 
ergative languages {predictably VOSIN or NSIOV), incorporated into an 
extended nucleus). 
Another instance of generalized representation of AT can.be seen in 
Japanese, where a "neutral" (non-topicalized) subject may be marked with 
the postpositive particle £1!. and AT may be marked ni for human beings 
(both as datives and also as Agent in passives!), places, and times. 
Thus for AT/SOC, AT/SPA, and AT/TEM (I have not been able to find out for 
AT/LOG) we have the particle ni which occurs after (outside) additional 
postpositional material, whiJe IT within the nucleus may be marked .9.!· 
It is interesting to see further that at least in cases where for example 
one sentence contains both an outer and an inner (extranuclear and intra-
nuclear) locative expression, there is a differentiated marking of AT; 
the nuclear AT of location is marked by ni and the extranuclear AT/SPA 
is marked by de (which itself is a historfcal descendant of nite). 
In Jinghpaw and apparently in Burmese the topic marker (as I would 
call it) occurs freely with four classes of NP or subordinate clause: 
gaw in Jinghpaw and ka. in Burmese occur freely with what EI would desi-g-
nate AT/SOC, AT/SPA, AT/TEM, and AT/LOG. 
The principles of EI, TI, LI, DS, together with the ordered set 
of questions in model strings and the NON principle, relate in an inter-
esting and to some extent explanatory way to some of the well-known Green-
berg Universals. We shall briefly survey some of these points of contact. 
Universal 1: In declarative sentences with nominal subject and ob-
ject, the dominant order is almost always one in which the subject 
precedes the object. 
This phenomenon of Agent-Object order is predicted by TI. It is 
noted in Chomsky 1965:126-127 and supported as a cognitive principle in 
experiments where N+V+N passives are at a certain age interpreted as 
actives (Dale 1972:150-151, lines 15-23). The principles in the case of 
verb- or nucleus-initial languages make contrary predictions in a system-
atic way, a way which predicts correctly the very few exceptions to Tl; 
any exception to Greenberg's observation (Universal One) occurs always 
and only because of this clash with EI in the case of verb- or nucleus-
initial structures; therefore, every exception should accord strictly.with 
whatever EI dictates. The principles in conjunction also make predictions 
(or·decrees, if we think in terms of acquisition) to the effect that only 
6/120 of·the possible orders of (Agentive) Subject, Verb, Object, Indirect 
Object, and Nonterm material (e.g. adverbial material such as PP's) 
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satisfy them. Ultimately, it is shown, the six orders prescribed cor-
respond to the six known to exist as basic orders in natural languages. 
Universal 3: Languages with dominant VSO order are always pre-
positional. 
That this should be so is predicted both by LI and the VO vs. OV 
criteria. 
Universal 4: With overwhelmingly greater than chance frequency, 
languages with normal SOV order are postpositional. 
This is likewise predicted by both OV and LI. I have not had the 
opportunity yet to check on any of the listed exceptions except Amharic, 
but it seems that the fact that this universal could not be stated as 
absolute has to do with a failure to distinguish between NP- or argument-
internal versus NP-external (deep case) marking, already discussed here. 
Amharic, listed by Greenberg as an exception to Universal Two, is describ-
ed by Gene B. Gragg (1972:159) as having both prepositions and postposi-
tions. If this is the case, then I sus,ect that the postpositions are 
NP-external and the prepositions are NP-internal. Even if it is the 
other way around, the principles (and presumably Greenberg 1 s universals} 
can only be falsified or truly contradicted in cases wherein one order or 
another is either uniquely or clearly predominant; in cases of free 
variation of word order the principles are rendered empty of prediction, 
except for DS in its domain. 
Universal 6: All languages with dominant VSO order have SVO as 
an alternative or as the only alternative order. 
This is explained by fact that verb-initial structures cannot 
satisfy both EI and TI. VSO (as opposed to VOS) satisfies TI at the ex-
pense of nuclear integrity (EI) and therefore has at least one alternate 
order which satisfies both EI and TI, i.e. SVO, VSOIN, SVOIN). 
Universal 7: If in a language with dominant SOV order, there is no 
alternative basic order, or only OSV as the alternative, then all 
adverbial modifiers of the verb likewise precede the verb. 
Universal Seven follows from NON. 
Universal 13: If the nominal object always precedes the verb, 
then verb forms subordinate to the main verb also precede it. 
This follow from NON. 
Universal 14: In conditional statements, the conditional clause 
precedes the conclusion as the normal order in all languages. 
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This is a matter in the case of IT-AT languages of preposing, which 
reflects sensitivity to information structure (DSI5). A related preposing 
phenomenon of apparently universal scope in the case of languages showing 
responsiveness or sensitivity to DS is the position of AT with respect to 
IT in existential as opposed to locative sentences (Kuno 1973 or 1971). 
The only reason that we need limit these conments on preposing to IT-AT 
languages is that the 11 preposed 11 position is in effect already basic in 
any AT-IT language which is not sensitive to DS. Therefore Greenberg is 
able to state (p. 311) that 11 It seems probably that all language expres-
sions of time and place may appear in the initial positions in the sent-
ence". This of course is imply a matter of sensitivity to IS in IT-AT 
languages, since only DS would ever result in anything else in an AT-IT 
language. The following quote from Greenberg (also from page 311) illus-
trates vividly the point of contact between DS and TI; 
The order of elements in language parallels that in physical exper-
ience or the order of knowledge. In the instance of conditionals, 
although the truth relations are timeless, logicians have a.lways 
symbolized in the order implying, implied exactly as in spoken 
language. If modus onens is used in proof, then we have a prag-
matic· example w ic follows the order of reasoning. No one thinks 
to write a proof backwards. 
Universal 15: In expressions of volition and purpose, a subordinate 
verbal form always follows the main verb as the normal order except 
in those languages in which the nominal object always precedes the 
verb. 
This universal, which holds even in some verb-final languages such 
as Burmese and Jinghpaw, follows of course from TI. 
Universal 16: In languages with dominant order VSO, an in.fleeted 
auxiliary always precedes the main verb. In languages with dominant 
order SOV, and inflected auxiliary always follows the main verb. 
This universal follows from NON, but only if the so-called "inflected 
auxiliary" is analyzed as a higher verb. 
Universal 39: Where morphemes of both number and case are present 
and both follow or both precede the noun base, the expression-of 
number almost always comes between the noun base and the expression 
of case. 
That this should be the case follows from EI. This relation of EI 
to Greenberg's Universal Thirty-nine is clear only in the light of the 
acquisitional sequences provided in Slobin 1966:141-143, where the earlier 
acquisition of number (concrete, NP-internal) is shown to precede the 
acquisition of relational classes such as case {NP-external, less concrete} 
in Russian. Thus EI characterizes Universal 39 and Slobin's facts as re-
lated by predicting both. 
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7. The Space Hierarchy and Psychological Reality: Sequence as Hierarchy 
in Cognitive Development and Language Acquisition 
It was mentioned earlier that there was possibly available a class 
of evidence external to linguistic study that lends independent support to 
the space hierarchy of egodeictic iconicity. That source of evidence lies 
in the sequence of what I would call "space acquisitions" which are 
studied as a part of cognitive development. The fact that all my refer-
ences in this area either are written by Piaget and his colleagues or 
refer to his work almost exclusively in some cases reflects not so much a 
theoretical bias on my part as the fact that Piaget seems to have no 
serious competition in the field of cognitive development (theory and ex-
perimentation). It will be seen, however, that the observations cited in 
support of the hierarchy of spaces I have discussed are empirically based 
material and not merely theoretical construct-stages. Further, not only 
is Piaget not committed to any given linguistically defined acquisition 
theory but he makes no detailed application of the cited sequences in 
cognitive development to sequences in 11 space 11 acquisition as reflected in 
language. 
It will be recalled that the principle of EI is a claim at one 
level that order outward from some center (head of construction, base 
form, etc.) in linguistic representation reflects directly the sequence 
of linguistic ~cquisition which itself preserves sequence in cognitive 
development. 
We will not trace the sequence of acquisitions in cognitive develop-
ment which I take to underly the other two reflecting orders. First, 
though, we observe that the cognitive development of a child is segmented 
into approximately four stages: the first stage, the sensory-motor 
period, is in many cases observed to cover the two years immediately 
following birth, the second is a preoperational period (2-7); then there 
is the period of concrete operations (7-11); and a period of formal opera-
tions (11-15). I assume that, regardless of the status of these "divisions 
as such, their sequence is uncontested. 
The beginning point of the process of egodecentration which we are 
about to trace is such that is a lack of differentiation between self-
internal and self-external states, processes, or constructs. (The 
extracts from Beadle 1971, Carroll 1964, Slobin 1971, and Piaget and 
Inhelder 1969 have been provided in the final appendix for a more co-
herent and integrated presentation of Piaget 1 s work as it touches our 
subject. In this text, however, I shall only sketch a crude outline of 
pertinent material.) At first there is no basis for systematic differ-
entiation among the contents of consciousness with reference to distribu-
tion of entities in terms of persons, places, times, or condition. At 
first all isperceptual and concrete: 
For children in the sensory-motor period of development, the time 
dimension is now; the space dimension is here; and the orientation 
is me. (Bead°fe""l971:131-132, lines 1-3} ~--
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During the first two years of life we have the emergence of per-
ceptual invariants which will later be differentiated into persons and 
nonpersons (or things). The process of restructuring the contents of 
consciousness during this time from a world without others to a world 
wherein others not only exist but also have their own perspectiv~s pre-
cedes the process of parallel decentration with respect to the physical 
universe. That is, SOC develops (is "factored out" of the contents of 
consciousness) before SPA and TEM come in, i.e., before the restructur-
ing of the universe from being centered on the body of the child to being 
an objective spatio-temporal realm independent of inmediate perception. 
(Piaget and Inhelder 1969:21-26, esp. lines 1-41 and 116-134; 92-95, 
esp. lines 37-68) 
By the time that a child begins to construct a world of space and 
time he is already living in a world of persons. During the period of 
concrete operations we see a focusing and differentiation in the realm of 
the spatial and the temporal; time comes to be differentiated from space 
with the development of the notion of speed with reference to moving 
objects (cf. Fillmore 1971 and the problem of Source and Goal in Place 
and Time which was discussed earlier). (Piaget and Inhelder 1969:107-
109, esp. lines 29-50) 
Somewhere around ages el even or twe 1 ve through fourtee.n or fifteen 
we see the acquisition of LOG or abstract space, wherein operations are 
performed on form independent of concrete content. (Piaget and Inhelder 
1969:100, 130-133, 152-153) 
It is of course unnecessary to belabor the point that "space acqui-
sition" as I have called it is not a matter of adding something onto an 
otherwise intact structure; rather, each new structure incorporates and 
integrates the previously acquired ones. (Piaget and Inhelder 1969: 
152-153) Thus we note a consistently transitive asymmetry in distribu-
tion (of spaces) in spaces: 
Nonzero distribution in SOC entails nonzero distribution in SPA; 
Nonzero distribution in SPA entails nonzero distribution in TEM; 
Nonzero distribution in TEM entails nonzero distribution in LOG. 
Nonzero distribution in LOG does not entail distribution in TEM; 
Nonzero distribution in TEM does not entail distribution 1n SPA; 
Nonzero distribution in SPA does not entail distribution in SOC. 
It will be recalled that the relation of IT versus AT is something 
imposed upon things which are actually in a continuum relationship and 
may be divided differently in different languages. For example, it. has 
been suggested that, while a tree may be either an IT or an AT in English 
depending upon the nature of the other referent, a tree is not treated so 
freely as an AT in Japanese as it is in English (Prof. Mathias of East 
Asian Languages and Literatures, Indiana University, personal communica-
tion). If we take the classes of entities and positions of a given space 
as a continuous whole, the space inclusions mentioned above might be 
characterized informally as follows: 
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Distribution with respect to persons is distribution in SOC. 
Persons are widely interpreted either as being bodies or as having 
bodies in the sense of be1ng"in" bodies. 
Bodies are physical objects. 
Distribution of or with respect to physical objects is distribution in 
SPA. Ultimately, locations in SPA are difficult to show to be 
essentially different from entities or objects in SPA, i.e. phys-
ical objects (e.g., the arbitrarily defined difference based on 
magnitude leads us to feel that a continent is less a physical ob-
ject than a lump on the forehead or to feel that a piece of paper 
is less a location than a farm, but it is not difficult to find 
another object/location to reverse the status of IT versus AT}. 
Likewise, it is difficult to show locations or positions in TEM 
as being independent of reference to or definition in terms of 
temporal entities, i.e. events or processes. 
Further, examination and reflection reveal that physical objects 
necessarily have extent in time as well as obvious extent in space: 
What we think of as a phenomenal thing is distinguished from 
what we think of as a phenomenal event or process only in the 
pattern of differences among its temporal parts. A thing is 
a monotonous event; an event is an unstable thing. (Goodman 
1966:357} 
Distribution of or with respect to events in time is distribution in TEM. 
Actual events, processes, objects, are widely interpreted as having 
potentially alternative events, processes, objects which are con-
ceivable but not actual. 
Actual relations or conjunctions of events, objects, qualia, are 
thus in some sense a subset of the conceivable, i.e., the variables 
in propositions which correspond to actual referents are a subset 
of those (indices or classes of indices} which are conceivable. 
Distribution of or with respect to abstract propositions is distribution 
in LOG. 
Yet another way of showing how the spaces relate (it should not be 
forgotten that, although our discussion has been limited to the four 
spaces which are interpreted as external to self, I suspect that every 
regularity which we have observed with respect to the external hierarchy 
of spaces has an equally interesting (linguistically and otherwise} 
counterpart in the three or so internal spaces} is to consider the follow-
ing sequence of differentiation: 
First of course there is the dissociation of self from nonself: 
1. THE WORLD INSIDE; THE WORLD OUTSIDE 
Detecting that nonself or the world outside contains objects which 
persistently show signs of being like self, we differentiate beings 
and nonbeings: 
2. PERSONS; THINGS 
Within the realm of nonbeings, some are much more stable than others 
(cf. the extracted observation from Goodman 1966): 
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3. THINGS I HAPPENINGS 
When form is apprehended and can be exploited without reference to 
content, then the concrete and the abstract can be dissociated: 
4. THE ACTUAL f THE CONCEIVABLE (events f propositions) 
Lack of time, space, and,presumably, the patience of the reader take 
us directly now to another sphere of support or disconfirmation of the 
space hierarchy of EI. 
It has been argued that the emergence of the grammatical categor-
ies verb and noun is a reflection of the separation of the object from 
the act which is observed at the end of the sensory-motor period (McNeill 
1970:73). Regardless of the success of that argument, one might ask if 
the space hierarchy, which is assumed to represent sequente in acquisi-
tion of both cognitive and linguistic structures, might not be falsifi-
able at least to some extent in terms of acquisition sequences as well 
as word order. On the basis of a very limited amount of material I shall 
try to show that such observations as are available in the literature not 
only do not disconfirm the proposed sequence but support it. If the space 
hierarchy is not false or vacuous one might expect to find evidence that 
the nucleus is developed prior to the surrounding spaces. The table which 
Dale (1972:46-48) adapts from Brown shows the first two-element sequences 
in child speech in terms of structural meaning (function) as well as 
grammatical class. 
According to the EI space hierarchy, the acquisition of AT/SOC could 
not precede that of anything nuclear, since SOC is a surrounding space. 
Thus EI could be falsified at this point if it were observed that acquisi-
tion of Agent NP ever preceded that of Object NP, for example. Note that 
the table does have an example of nuclear V+IT (#11. Action-Object) but 
does not have any example of objectless Agent-Action). Of the two most 
common noun functions (the most common N+N construction is Agent-Object 
according to Dale 1972: 46-48, lines 21-23) it is reported that Agents 
appear later (Dale 1972: 50): 
In the earliest sentences of children, nouns frequently occur as 
objects of actions but seldom as the agents who perform the action. 
Agents appear later. Similarly, during the development of noun 
phrases, elaboration occurs first for noun phrases that are objects 
and only later for noun phrases that occur earlier in the sentence. 
Dale attributes this sequence of elaboration as a matter of elaborating 
or adding to that which is at the end of what is acquired so far, but the 
difference of Object and Agent in acquisitional sequence is of course 
independent of such considerations. The other sentence and construction 
types of the table would have to have some way to distinguish inner from 
outer AT's in order to have any empirical bearing on the EI hierarchy. 
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After SOC is acquired, we might expect that SPA, TEM, and LOG be 
signalled in that sequence. Slobin (1966:141-143) has suggested that the 
order of grammatical classes, inflections is determined by the semantic 
and conceptual aspects of the forms to be learned. Referring to the use 
of common prepositions in Russian, he quotes Feofanov 1958:124: 
Initially, their use is confined to relations with a concrete meaning 
understood by the child from visual perception (space relations ... ); 
then it extends to relations without such visual support (relations 
of purpose, time relations, and space relations used figuratively}. 
Thus we have seen some evidence for the sequence of acquisi-tion NUC 
then SOC then SPA then TEM. Remaining to be shown is some sort of indica-
tion that evidence is likewise available to show that LOG is last: 
The conditional is very late, not being used until 2, 10, though 
its grarrmatical structure is exceedingly simple. Conditional sub-
ordinate clauses are also later, emerging at about 2, 8. In both 
cases it seems to be the semantic and not the grarmnatical aspect 
that is difficult for the child. 
(Slobin 1966:141-143, lines 21-26) 
It is suggested that any additional evidence which will bear on the 
correctness of the space hierarchy together with the consequences of its 
being assumed will in fact be supportive of EI. 
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NOTES 
Agentive (A), the case of the typically animate perceived instigator 
~the action identified by the verb.31 
31 The escape qualification 'typically' expresses my awareness that 
contexts which I will say require agents are sometimes occupied by 
'inanimate' nouns like robot or human institution nouns like nation. 
Since I know of no way of dealing with these matters at the moment, 
I shall just assume for all agents that they are 'animate'. 
Instrumental (I), the case of the inamimate force or object causally 
involved in the action or state identified by the verb.32 
32 Paul Postal has reminded me of the existence of sentences like 
i. I rapped him on the head with a snake. 
The requirement that instrumental NP's are 'inanimate' is the 
requirement to interpret i as having in its underlying structure 
something equivalent to with the body of a snake. The fact that 
there are languages which would require mention of a stem meaning 
'body' in this context may be considered as support for this position, 
and so may the unacceptability, pointed out by Lakoff, of sentences like 
ii: 
ii. *John broke the window with himself. (See Lakoff, 1967.) 
Dative (D), the case of the animate being affected by the state or 
the action identified by the verb. 
Factitive (F), the case of the object or being resulting from the 
action or state identified by the verb, or understood as a part 
of the meaning of the verb. 
Locative (L), the case which identifies the location or spatial 
orientation of the state or action identified by the verb. 
Objective (O), the semantically most neutral case, the case of 
anything representable by a noun whose role is the action or 
state identified by the verb is identified by the semantic 
interpretation of the verb itself; conceivably the concept 
should be limited to things which are affected by the action or 
state identified by the verb. The term is not to be confused with 
notion of direct object, nor with the name of the surface case 
synonymous with accusative. 
Additional cases will surely be needed. (Fillmore 1968:24-25) 
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I have lately become comfortable with the following cases: 
Agent, Experiencer, Instrument, Object, Source, Goal, Place, and Time. 
There is one more, but I'm saving that till later. I used to talk about 
"Datives," but I have reanalyzed the old Dative by spreading it around 
among the other cases. Where there is genuine psychological event or 
state verb, we have the Experiencer; where there is a non-psychological 
verb which indicates a change of state, such as ony of dying or growing, 
we have the object; where there is a transfer or movement of something 
to a person, the receiver as destination is taken as the Goal. I no longer 
confuse selection restrictions to animates with true case-like notions. 
(Fillmore 1971:251) 
NOTE TWO 
The 'explanatory' use of this framework resides in the necessary claim 
that, although there can be compound instances of a single case 
(through noun phrase conjunction), each case relationship occurs only 
once in a simple sentence. 26 
26 It follows that whenever more than one case form appears in the 
surface structure of the same sentence (on different noun phrases), 
either more than one deep-structure case is involved or the sentence 
is complex. If, for example, German lehren is discribed as a verb 
which 'takes two accusatives', we have reason to believe that in the 
deep structure, the two object nouns are distinct as to case. Often 
enough the language will provide evidence for the distinction, as in 
the occurrence of such passive sentences as das wurde mir gelehrt. 
(Fillmore 1968:21; cf. Gruber 1965) 
NOTE THREE 
In order to formalize a characterization for certain phenomena of 
overlap among case forms in English and other languages and facts 
of implication (e.g. "The perfective of the dynamic implies the 
(unmarked) imperfective of the static sentence which is in correspondence 
with it" Lyons 1968:398), Anderson proposes that loc(ative) and 
all(ative), which do not contrast (or co-occur) in a clause, be 
col:f.,apsed to loc and that the difference between dynamic and static 
clauses be manifested by the presence or absence of the abl(ative) 
case category. This corresponds closely to Gruber's derivation of 
TO from AT (when the verb is "motional") and FROM from TO NOT from 
from AT NOT (see Fillmore 1966:fn12; Gruber 1970:52-53; Anderson 
119-124). The question will be ignored in our discussion • 
.J 
NOTE FOUR 
Mostly because of lack of space and time, we will not deal with those 
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